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"There is a minimun level of resources that must be devoted to e o
a development program if it is to have any chance of success. Lnching
a country into self-sustaining growth is a little like getting an air-
plane off the ground. There is a critical ground speed which nwt be
1passed before the craft can become airborne. . ." Proceeding "bit by
bit" will not add up in its effects to the sum total of the single
bits0 A minimum quantum of investment is a necessary (though not
sufficient) condition of success. This is in a nutshell the contention
of the theory of the big push.
It seems to contradict the conclusions of the traditional static
equilibrium theory and reverses its famous mtto: "natura non fecit
saltus." It does so for three reasons: /7irt because it is based
on a set of more realistic assumptions of certain indivisibilities
and "non-appropriabilities"2 in the production functions even on the
IThe ObJectives of U. 8, Economic Assistance Programs (Center for
International Studies, M.I.T., Special Committee to Study the Foreign
Aid Program, Washington, D. C. 1957) P. 70.
2 Impossibility to appropriate.
I
2level of a static equilibrium theory. These indivisibilities give rise
to increasing returns and to (technological) external economies.
because dealing with problems of growth it examines the path towards
equilibrium and not only the conditions at a point of eqimbrium.
At a point of static equilibrium net nvestment is sero. The theory
of growth is very largely a theory of investment. The allocation of
investment, however, - unlike the allocation of given stocks of consumer
goods (equilibrium of consumption), or of producers goods (equilibrium
of production) - is necessarily an imperfect market, i.e. a market on
which prices do not signal all the information required for an "optiman
solution. Additional signalling devices apart from market prices are
required0 2, 3 The author and maW economists believe that those can be
See P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan, "Programming in Theory and in Italian
Practice" in Investment Criteria and Economic Growth, Center for International
Studies, M.I.T., Cambridge (Massachusetts), 19550
2 Futures markets and futures prices could perhaps provide such
aignalling devices. It is a moot point whether perfect fatures markets
for all goods can exist. The author's suspicion (without proof) is that
they cannot exist for the same reasons for which perfect foresight is
impossible. In reality they certainly do not exist.
3
"In an economy in which economic disins are decentralised, a
system of communications is needed to enable each person who makes economic
decisions to learn about the economic decisions of others and coordinate
his decisions with theirs. In the market economgr, prices are the
signalling device that informs each person of other people's economic
decisions; and the merit of perfect competition is that it would cause
prices to transmit information reliably and people to respond to this
-information properly. Market prices, however, reflect the economic
situation as it is and not as it will be, For this reason, they are
more useful for coordinating current production decisions, which are
immediately effective and guided by short-run considerations, than they
are for coordinating investment decisions which have a delaed effect and-
looking ahead to a long future period-should be governed not by what the
present economic situation is but by what the future economic situation is
expected to be. The proper coordination of investment decisions, therefore,
would require a signalling device to transmit information about present plans
and future conditions as they are determined by present plans; and the pricing
system fails to provide this." (T. Scitovsky, "Two Concepts of External
Economies," Uue~fPeijeeng 1954,)
3provided by programming. - Given the imperfect investment market, pecuniary
external economies have the same effect in the theory of growth as tech-
nological external economies; they are a cause of a possible divergence
1between the private and the social marginal net product, Since pecuniary
(unlike technological) external economies are all-pervading and frequent,
the price mechanism does not necessarily put the econong on an optimau
path*
ffhirdly, in addition to the risk phenomena and imperfections
characterizing the "investment equilibrium," markets in underdeveloped
counties: are even more imperfect than in developed countries. Price
mechanism in such imperfect markets does not provide the signals which
guide a perfectly competitive economy towards an optimun position.
2. Te
Indivisibilities and external economies are' porte-aanteau expressim
which are .loosely used in literature, Fortunately, recent publications
2have clarified the concepts so that terminology may be settled in a
shorthand way. Not al indivisibilities give rise to external economies
and not al external economies are due to indivisibilities; some external
economies are due to the impossibility to appropriate a factor-..even if
divisible. Pecuniary external economies are an almost superfluous concept
See T. Scitovsky, go. cit., Journal of Political Economy. 1954.
2 See H. Arndt, "External Economies Reconsidered," Economic Record. 1954;
T. Scitovaky, oE. _cit., Journal of Political Economy, 1954; F. Bator, "Elements
of the Pure Economics of 'Social Overhead Capital," Part III of M.I.T. Ph.D.
Thesis, 19561 L. Lefeber, "External Economies and Transportation," Part I of
M.I.T. Ph.D. Thesis, 9561 x. Fleming,"External Economies and the Doctrine
of Balanced Growth," Economic Journal, 1955-confines his analysis large3y
to conditions of a static equilibriu.
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in static equilibrium theory. They refer to those interindustry relations
which are due to the fact that production functions of different industries
are not linearl and homogeneous. Their true function in the theory of
static equilibrium is to mark a place for a concept Whish will become
important in the theory of growth. Technological externa economies
are rare in a static competitive econcmy with one important exceptions
2
training of labor and education, In the theory of growth, however
external economies abound because given the inherent imperfection of
the investment market, imperfect knowledge and risks$ pecuniary and
technological external economies have a similarly disturbing effect
on the path towards equilibrium. While the distinction between pecuniary
and technological external economies becomes practically irrelevant in
the theory of growth, three different kinds of indivisibilities and
external economins may be distinguished.
This is almost but not quite the same as saying that there are
indivisibilities in the production functions. There can be continuous
though non-linear production functions where for instance ilputs and
outputs are non-linearly linked. The decisive criterion is non-convexity
of production possibility curves. In most cases that is due to indivisibilitieso
In a slave econoMy investment in training slave workers may pay.
In a non-slave economy in which mortgages on workers do not exist, a
trained worker may contract at a higher wage rate with another firm which
did not invest in his training. The supply of training facilities in a
competitive econory will therefore be normally below optimum. The
best way of training workers is probably "on the job." Industrial
workers in towns with many establishments and industries acquire skill
by working, by talking to each other, exchanging experiences and changing
jobs, much more quickly than isolated peasants. This fact alone, apart
from better division of labor, is a source of increasing returns to
the industrial system as a whole and a differential advantage of
industrialization.
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1) Indivisibility in the production function especially the
indivisibility of supply of Social Overhead Capital (lumpiness
"capital") - discussed under 3.
2) "Indivisibility" of Demand (complementarity of demand)
discussed under 4)
3) "Indivisibility" (kink in the) Supply of Savings - discussed
under 6.
In one way the first indivisibility is fundantal; if it did not
exist the others would not arise. Linear homogeneous production functions
are basic in this sense, but they are completely unrealistic. They
imply no economies of scale or of agglomeration, no entrepreneurship,
no phenomenon of mininmu quantum or threshold, so that they threaten to
obscure the nature of economic process and the risks involved rather
than to throw light on it, In re4lity there are indivisibilites in the
production function. They create not only non-constant returns but also
risks of investment and imperfect markets which give rise to the
"indivisibility" (complmentarity) of demand.
3. Indivisibility in the Production Funitton (L~Wpiness of Capital)
1) Indivisibilities of inputs, processes or outputs give rise to
increasing returns, - i.e. economies of scale - and may require a high
optinum sise of a firm. This is not a very important obstacle to
development since with some exceptions (for instance in Central America)
even in small and poor countries there it usually sufficient demand
for at least one optiwmn scale firm in mW industries. There my be
room, however, only for one or few firms with the obvious danger of
monopolistic markets.
6Increasing returns accrue t a irm not only with the growth of
its size but also with the growth of the industry and with the growth
of the industrial system as a I1r (Allyn A. Young), Better speciali..
zation, better use of resources become possible when growth helps to
overcome indivisibilities generating pecuniary external economies. The
range of increasing returns seems to be very wide indeed.
2) Social Overhead Capital is the most important instance of
indivisibility and externalities on the supply side., Its services
are indirectly productive with long gestation periods and delayed
yields. Its most important "products" are investment opportunities
created in other industries. Social Overhead Capital comprises all
those basic industries like power, transport, comumications, etc.
which must precede the more quickly yielding, directly productive
investments and which constitute the framework or "infrastructure"
and the "overhead costs" as it were of the econony as a whole. Its
installations are characterized by a sizeable initial lump and low
variable costs. Since they require a3 reat minimum size, excess
capacity will be unavoidable over the initial period in underdeveloped
countries. Over and above a high minimum quantum of each firm or
The capital-output ratio in the United States has fallen over the
last eighty years from around 4 to around 3:1, while income per head,
wage-rates and the percentage of "heavy industries" was rising. This
is due to technical progress (chafte in production functions),
increasing returns on balance (increasing returns prevailing over
decreasing returns) and to th Mi* ing demand for labor-intensive
services characteristic of h, nome economies. It is nyr conviction
that increasing returns p considerable part in it.
We may distinguish in fact-between the "developmental" Social
Overhe4 Capital which provides for a hoped for but uncertain future
demandand the "rehabilitation" Social Overhead Capital which caters
to an unsatisfied demand of: the past. The first its excess
capacity will ne cessarily have a big sectorial .a -output ratio
(10-15.:1); the second breaking bottlenecks has a .rtain high
indirect productivity and a much lower capital-output ratio.
7industry there is also an irreducible minimum industry mix of different
"public utilities," so that an underdeveloped country will have to
invest between 30 and 40 per cent of its total investment into these
channels. Since vision at large is required as well as good foresight
of future development, programming is undoubtedly required in this
"lumpy" field; "normal" market mechanisms will not provide an optimum
supply0
Social Overhead Capital presents in sum four characteristic
indivisibilities:
1) It is "indivisible" (irreversible) in time; it must precede
other "directly productive" investments*
2) Its equipment has high minimum durability; lesser durability
is either technically impossible or much less efficient, For this
and other reasons it is very "lumpy,"
3) It has long gestation periodi.
4) An irreducible minimum S.0.C, industry mix (of various public
utilities) is a condition for getting off the "dead end."
5) Services of Social Overhead Capital cannot be imported.
A high initial investment in Social Overhead Capital must therefore
either precede or be known to be certainly available in order to pave
the way for additional more quickly yielding directly productive inM
vestments, This indivisibility constitutes one of the main obstacles
to development of underdeveloped countrieso
2. "Indivisibility" of Demand (Complementarity of Demand)
1) Relatively few investments are made in a small market of an
underdeveloped country. If all investment projects were independent
(which they are not) and if their number grew, the risk of each
8investment project would be declining by simple actuarial rules. 1
The lower marginal risk of each investment dose (or project) would
lead to either higher or cheaper credit facilities and would thus
constitute "internal economies."
2) In reality, however, various investment decisionAi are not
independent; investment projects have high risks because of uncertainty
whether their products will find a market.
Iet us restate our old example,2 at first for a closed econow. 3
If a hundred workers who were in disguised unemployment (i.e. with
marginal productivity of their labor equal to zero) in an underdeveloped
country were put into a shoe factory, their wages would constitute
additional income. If the newly employed workers spent all of their
additional income on shoes they produce, the shoe factory would find
a market and would succeed. In fact, however, they would not spend
all of their additional income on shoes; there is no "easy" solution
of creating in this way an additional market.5 The risk of not finding
1 See T. M. Wtin.
2 See "Industrialisation of Eastern and Southeastern Europe,"
Economic ournal, 1943; and R. Nurkse, Problems of Capital Formation
In Unrdeveloped Countries, Oxford, 1953.
3 The assumption of a closed economy will be dropped in 5.
On the concept and measurement of disguised unemployment, see my
"Notes on Disguised Unemployment, Part I, Center for International
Studies, Cambridge (Massachusetts), 1956.
In an open economy the shoe factory may, of course, efficiently
substitute former shoe imports, or may be efficient enough to find
export markets, although this too is uncertain. (See 5.)
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a market reduces the incentive to invest - the shoe factory investment
project will probably be abandoned. - Let us vary the example: instead
of a hundred (unemployed) workers in one shoe factory, let us put ten
thousand workers in say one hundred factories (and farms) who between
them will produce the bulk of such (wage) goods on which the newly
employed workers will spend their wages. What was not true in the
case of one single shoe factory will become true for the complementary
system of one hundred factories (and farms). The new producers would
be each other's customers and would verify Say's Law by creating an
additional market. The complementarity of demand would reduce the
risk of not finding a market. Reducing such interdependent risks
increases naturally the incentive to invest.
3) If one unit of any (wage) good could be produced as efficiently
as many units - i.e. if there were no indivisibilities in the production
functions of wage goods - a relatively small investment might suffice
to produce a product mix which would satisfy (and create) the additional
market, Indivisibilities make the minimum investment much larger.
The risk of any single investment in one product is increased by
the fact that various goods are highly imperfect substitutes for each
other in low income underdeveloped countries. The "South-West" corner
of the indifference line map shows very high degrees of convexity;
demand for most goods will therefore be highly inelastic. The low
elasticities of demand make it much more difficult to fit supplies
to demands. The difficulty of fitting demand to supply on a small-
scale constitutes a risk which is higher on a small than on a large
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and growing market. The complementarity of demand will reduce the
marginal risk of growing and diversified investments, but it will
be below a "minimum sensibile" for small doxs of investmert a There
is therefore a minimum threshold at which the complementarity of
demand manifests itself. The discontinuity in the complementarity
of demand may therefore be called "indivisibility" of demand.
4) A minimum quantum of investment is required to produce the
bulik (or a good bunle) of additional wage goods on which additionally
employed workers will spend their additional income. Unless it is
probable that other investments will take place many single investment
projects may be too risky to be undertaken. The need to mobilise
investment sufficient to provide this minimum quantum is the first
hurdle which underdeveloped countries must overcome, but it is not the
only one. Even if savings and investment sufficient for a minimum
quantum of wage goods were forthcoming, the need to create beforehand
a minimum quantum of Social Overhead Capital constitutes a second
hurdle which must be overcome. While the first minimum quantum of
investment in wage goods may amount to say $20 million, the minimum
quantum of investment in Social Overhead Capital may amount to say
$60 - $80 million. The effective minimum of total investment may
thus amount to - and to require a "big push" of - $80 - $100 million
5. International trade reduces the size of the minia push.
Complementarity of demand was examined in paragraph 4 under the
assumption of a closed economr. In an open economy a shoe factory might
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substitute former imports or may be efficient enough to find export
markets. The world market can be a substitute for the additional
domestic market required in a closed econoer. Can it then provide
enough continuity to dispense with the need for a r4nim quantum of
iSeatment? It is submitted that the mobility of products is in
reality an imperfect substitute for the mobility of factors., Inter-
national trade undoubtedly reduces the range of the "inimpa-push"
required, so that not all the wage goods need be produced in the
developing country, but it does not eliminate it.
The great expans ion of international trade in the nineteenth
century has led to neither an equalization or even to a reduction
in the inequality of factor rewards. Theoretically this fact may
be due to three reasons: 1) transport costs as impediments to
the mobility of factors, 2) complete rather than partial specialis
sation of production, 3) different production fanctions in different
countries.
Transport costs were sharply reduced during the last 150 years;
44his should have led to a growing equalisation of factor rewards.
In the same way partial specialization of production accounted
for a growing proportion of the volum of international trade in the
nineteenth century. The English Industrial Revolution may have
increased the share of complete specialization; export gainers
ezpan ed in England more than import-savers at that time. Subsequent
industrializations, however, for instance in Germwy, showed a greater
expansion of import-saving than of export gaining production, although
'See P. A. Samnlson, "Internatimalfade and the Equalization of
Factor Prices, Economic Journal, 1948 and 19490
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exact statistical information does not seem to exist. There can
hardly be arty doubt that the share of complete specialization in
international trade was falling during the last hundred years. This
should have led to a growing equalization of factor rewards in the
world econow.
The main burden of explaining why this tendency did not materialize
at all - labor rewards in fact showed the opposite tendency of becoming
more uneal2 - seems to fall on the assumption that production functions
are different in various perts of the world. "The laws of nature may
be the same 'everywhere,' but the laws of nature and the eoononically
relevant production functions relating maximum output obtainable from
specified concrete Inputs are two quite different things. Effective
knowledge ('know-how') is probably as important a variable in under-
standing economic history and geography as is specific factor
endowments ... The effective organisation is different 3 There is
no doubt that differences in effectiveness of organization do exist
in different countries and that effective knowledge "cannot be acquired
by reading a book or by editorial exhortation." It can be acquired,
howeveVr-bn the job" 8
Much depends, of course, on the definition of the "sine" or "rimilar"
products in various countries.
2 This wais not due to a differentially higher increase in populationin. the underdeveloyed countries. On the contrary, their increase in
population was smaller than that of developed countries.
P, A. Samuelson, op. cit., (1948), p. 181.
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This possibility is a major source of increasing returns to the
industrial system as a whole - and perhaps the most important yield
of "development" is a cuhmlative increase in effective knowledge.
The growth of international trade during the last 150 years has not
reduced the inequality in this field.
We may conclude that international trade does not eliminate
although it reduces - the "indivisibility" of demand, even if markets
other than the investment market were more or less perfect. In
reality of course markets are imperfect - and those in underdeveloped
countries are probably more imperfect than in the developed ones.
International trade does much to reduce the danger of monopolies
it also effectively reduces the size of the "minimum quantum" of
investment - but it does not dispense with the need for a "big push".
6. "Indivisibility" in the Supply of Savings
A high minimum quantum of investment requires a high volume of
savings, which is difficult to achieve in low income underdeveloped
countries. The way out of the vicious circle is to have first an
increase in income (due to an increase in investment which mbilise.
additional latent resources) and to provide mechanisms which assure
that at the second stage the marginal rate of savings be very much
higher than the average rate of savings., Adam Smith's dictum that
frugality is a virtue and prodigality a vice has to be adapted to
a situation of growing income. Economic history does not show that
It reduces it to such an extent that "balanced growth" is not
required, although "big growth"' is, ,valanced growth" and "big push"
are not the same thing,
0h English Industrial Revolution was preceded by a period of falling
consumption; it only shows that the proportion saved from the increase
in income was higher than previous average savings.
The sero (or very low) price elasticity of supply of savings and
the high income elasticity of savings may be described as a third
"Indivisibility" in the Supply of Savings.
The three indivisibilities (under 3, 4, and 6) and the external
economies to which they give rise (plus the external economies of
training labor) form the characteristic pattern of models of growth
of underdeveloped countries,
7. Ppbolgcal "Indivisibilite" of the Develomnt Drive
The economic factors discussed so far give only the necessary
but not sufficient, conditions of growth. A "big push" seems required
to "Jump" over the economic obstacles to development. There may
be finally a phenomenon of indivisibility in the vigor and drive
required for a successful development policy. Isolated and small
efforts may not "add up" to a sufficient impact on growth an
"atmosphere" of development effervescence may also only arise with
a minimum speed or size of investment. Our knowledge of psychology
is far too deficient to theorise about this phenomenon. This does
not make it a less important factor, It may well constitute the
difference between necessary and sufficient conditions of success.
he extent and relative importance of the three indivisibilities
and external economies is greater in underdeveloped than in developed
countries. The same applies to the degree of imperfect knowledge and
of imperfect competition.
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8. A Glance at the Economic Histor of the Nineteenth Cent
Let us glance at the economic history of the last 150 years and
see how the absence of a "big push" in underdeveloped countries
prevented them from having a rate of growth comparable with that of
the advanced Western world. The classical economists have taught us
that given a long period of peace, order and security and a reasonable
economic policy of free trade and not too much Government interference,
the wealth of nations will increase and, moreover, the difference in
income per head among different parts of the world will tend to
diminish. This would be the effect of international trade even without
major capital movements, since the mobility of products is a good
(if not perfectr substitute for the mobility of factors. Between the
Congress of Vienna in 1815 and the outbreak of the First World War in
1914, we had a century of peace, order and security which is a period
long enough even for classical economists. It was moreover a century
of maximm international trade, technological progress and in addition
also very large movements of factors, both movement of capital and
migration of labor. Abundant manpower should result in low wages
which should attract capital and thereby increase employment, wages
and income. Yet international income differences have increased over
the nineteenth century instead of decreasing, since slightly over a
quarter of the world population increased its income per head
considerably, while the rest had to run very fast in order to stand
still. Lower wages in underdeveloped countries did not attract enough
capital to reduce the inequality in factor rewards nor did international
trade achieve fully this effect.
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The classical economists forecast proved wrong because they
neglected e2trnal econoies. The deficiency of Social Overhead Capital
caused diseconomies on capital account which more than compensated the
economies on wage accounts. The Western industrialists were not induced
to invest much in industries of underdeveloped countries. Take for
example the Lavnashire textile industrialists in the middle of the
nineteenth century. India was firmly under the British Rule. There were
neither insecurity nor balance of payments or transfer risks, and wages
in India were very much lower than in Lancashire. Yet any textile mill
project in India would have found an obstacle in the deficiency of Social
Overhead Capital which, for this single project alone, was unsurmountable
so that it could not avail itself of the advantage of lower wages. The
lumpiness of Social Overhead Capital would, however, have made one hundred
single project investments pay if there had been a sufficiently integrated
force to organise it. An inrestment trust like the East India Company
might have done it, but the single project approach of the City of London
made this integration impossible. Had there been an integrating, synchro-
nising "big push," the course of economic history of the world would have
been different.
